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Abstract 
 
Detailed and confidential data collected by government 
agencies have traditionally been difficult to access by 
analysts and researchers, despite the advantages to 
society from doing so. 
 
Access has, until recently, been constrained by 
technological and legal barriers; however, developments 
have reduced the impact of these.   
 
Despite these developments, accessing detailed, and 
confidential data, for analysis and research, remains 
difficult.  However, Research Data Centres (RDCs) 
provide a solution to reassure and efficiently distribute 
the risk of providing access to these data sources. 
 
This paper explains how RDCs can act as a ‘broker’ for 
enabling access to confidential data sources. 
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1  Introduction  
 
Throughout the UK, researchers are increasingly requesting 
access to confidential data sources which hitherto, have 
been unavailable to them, for a variety of reasons. Often, 
these sources of data are collected, managed and held by 
government agencies. Protecting the confidentiality of these 
data, and the individuals in society who have contributed 
these data to the agencies, is essential to ensure that public 
trust in authorities that collect these data is upheld, in 
addition to complying with legal obligations. 
The value of undertaking research using these confidential 
sources of data cannot be underestimated. Often, the 
additional level of detail (which elevates the confidential 
nature of these data) enables much more research to be 
undertaken than is the case when more ‘anonymised’ data 
are used. Examples include evaluation of government 
interventions and spatial analyses. Or, where data from 
different sources have been combined together, for example, 
linking of data from administrative sources that increase the 
number of characteristics about an individual or 
organisation, which enables more concise and robust 
research to be undertaken. Sometimes, the data subjects 
could be considered to be ‘vulnerable’: individuals at risk, 
or children, for example. 
Typically, such data are ‘de-identified’, or 
‘pseudonymised’, as the data do not contain directly 
identifiable information about the data subjects such as 
names and addresses; but with some effort, there is a risk 
that the identity of the data subjects could be revealed 
(because of the precise detail of the data which is useful for 
analysis and research). 
The inability to analyse such data restricts understanding 
about our society; and government programmes may be 
executed without sufficient evidence about what works well 
and what does not. 
Fortunately, the last ten years has witnessed a rapid growth 
in facilities (commonly described as ‘Research Data 
Centres’, RDCs) that enable access to confidential data 
(including detailed survey, linked and non-linked 
administrative data, biomedical data etc.) for analytical and 
research purposes. 
This paper discusses the skills of staff and their contribution 
in running these facilities, with respect to acting as brokers:  
both in terms of managing access on behalf of data suppliers, 
and negotiating for access to data.  As this paper will 
demonstrate, RDCs as brokers produce efficient outcomes 
for data access:  a more equitable distribution of access to 
data; and better management and fair distribution of risk, 
which data owners can accept when making decisions about 
providing access to their data. 
 
2 RDCs and establishing data access 
 As stated earlier, a number of RDCs now exist which 
provide access to confidential sources of data.  These 
include the ONS Virtual Microdata Laboratory, the UK 
Data Service Secure Lab, and the facilities created by the 
Administrative Data Research Network.  In the charity 
sector, both the Health Foundation and Cancer Research UK 
have established their own RDCs to manage confidential 
health records pertaining to patients. 
 
A detailed description of how an RDC works is provided by 
Schiller and Welpton (2013).  For brevity, it should be 
explained that RDCs operate on two principles: 
 
1. Data always reside in the secure data environment of 
the RDC; the data never leave.  Instead, statistical 
results are derived from the confidential data, and are 
released, subject to a check to ensure no individual 
could be identified, nor confidential information 
revealed (a process known as statistical disclosure 
control) 
2. Access to data is distributed; rather than, data being 
distributed.  Many RDCs now offer ‘secure remote 
access’ to data.  The first principle above is met; but 
analysts and researchers can access the data at one or 
more destinations, without the location of the data 
changing 
 
Established RDCs have demonstrable operating procedures, 
data governance protocols and accreditation to assure data 
owners, and the public, that they are capable of providing 
safe and secure access to confidential data.  As a result, more 
confidential data sources, including detailed survey and 
administrative data, collected in confidence by data owners, 
are accessed through RDCs than ever before.  Only a few 
years ago, it seemed impossible to envisage, for example, 
access to detailed linked education and earnings data.  As a 
result, we have a better idea of the returns to education from 
studying different courses at different education institutions.  
Accessing more detailed health records has enabled us to 
achieve improved rates of, for example, bowel cancer 
screening uptake. 
 
A well-established route exists for accessing detailed, 
confidential sources.  Data owners supply their data to 
RDCs, who in turn, make access available to analysts and 
researchers.  Processes are in place for managing the data, 
staff vet statistical results to prevent accidental re-
identification of data subjects, before releasing to the 
analysts and researchers.  The risk of providing data access 
(i.e. that data confidentiality is compromised) is distributed 
efficiently between the data owner, the RDC, and the analyst 
(the data owner no longer bears all the risk of providing 
access to their data).   
 
As a result, relationships between data owners and RDCs 
have flourished; as successful secure access to confidential 
data sources have been demonstrated, and valuable analysis 
and research published as a result of this access, more data 
owners now allow their data to be accessed through an RDC. 
3 Foundations of access 
 
Prior to the development of RDCs, access to confidential 
data was less well established, and relied on good 
relationships between data owners and individual analysts 
and researchers. 
 
Often, data would be supplied to an analyst or researcher 
directly from a data owner.  Or else, an agreement would be 
made that the analyst or researcher would access the data on 
the premises of the data owner. 
 
These ‘one-to-one’ arrangements continue to exist, and do 
so when both parties share a common objective, i.e. analysis 
which will benefit them both. 
 
However, there are downsides to such arrangements: 
 
1. The risk is unevenly managed (typically the data owner 
takes all or most of the risk of providing access to 
confidential data) 
2. As a consequence, there is no incentive for the data 
owner to provide access to any other analysts or 
researchers, and the benefits that could accrue to society 
for making such data securely available are not realised 
3. The arrangement may be informal, or opaque; which 
can have reputational consequences for the data owner 
(particularly in the event of an adverse data incident) 
4. The analyst or researcher has a monopoly on the data; 
the ability to reproduce results which is standard 
practice in scientific research, is limited 
5. Issues about data retention and metadata are unlikely to 
be addressed (neither data owner or analyst or 
researcher has an incentive to do so; unlike RDCs who 
experience ‘repeat custom’) 
 
Unlike the RDC model of data access, it’s clear from the 
description above that we achieve a much less satisfactory 
outcome for access to confidential data, and fewer benefits 
of data collection are realised. 
 
Despite these limitations, we should still remember that 
these one-to-one arrangements do achieve data access; and 
can be a way of gently easing a data owner into the 
framework of longer-term and more robust access.  It can 
also demonstrate to the data owner, the value of enabling 
access to confidential data. 
 
However, it is unlikely that these one-to-one arrangements 
will usefully lead to long-term data access decisions, 
because of the risk and the amount of work on behalf of the 
data owner to provide access.  Having separate 
conversations with a number of analysts and researchers 
about providing bespoke access is likely to be time-
consuming (an important factor when one considers that 
data access is not often a priority for a data owner). 
 
This is an area where an RDC (or data service) can help.  
The next section considers the role of an RDC as providing 
a ‘data brokerage’ service, acting as an intermediary 
between data owners and analysts and researchers to achieve 
efficient confidential data access outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
4 RDC as broker 
4.1  How can an RDC facilitate access to 
confidential data? 
 
The concept of an RDC is now well-established.  The ONS 
Virtual Microdata Laboratory, since it’s establishment in 
2004, has demonstrated how to provide safe and secure 
access to confidential data.  The UK Data Service Secure 
Lab and Administrative Data Research Network are 
examples of RDCs that provide access to confidential data 
from a range of data owners (mostly government 
departments, but also, other research institutes that collect 
data). 
 
All have adopted the 5 Safes framework (see Desai et al, 
2016) for managing data; this demonstrates that RDCs have 
knowledge and experience of managing who is permitted 
access to data (and how they are monitored once access is 
granted); what projects are untaken with the data; that the 
technology and IT infrastructure where data are stored and 
accessed is robust; and that staff can ensure that statistical 
outputs, when released from the secure environment, cannot 
be used to re-identify data subjects, nor reveal any 
confidential information. 
 
In this respect, RDCs can provide much assurance to data 
owners about how their data will be managed and accessed.  
They are better able to do so, as this is their incentive for 
operating:  they have sufficient detachment from using the 
data themselves (unlike analysts and researchers), such that 
they will prioritise managing data and access to data.  This 
is of benefit to all concerned, and especially to ensure that 
the flow of data available for analysis and research can 
continue. 
 
A lone analyst or researcher is much less likely to be in the 
position to provide these assurances to a data owner: this is 
not their primary focus (which is to analyse data and 
produce statistical results).  
 
RDCs, through their resources and expertise, can also 
unload the burden of risk which stems from providing access 
to confidential data.  This is through their management of 
access to data as depicted by the 5 Safes framework; and in 
doing so, can enable the data owner to provide more access 
to confidential data for the long-term.  Again, an analyst or 
researcher will not be in this position. 
 
In turn, the advantages for analysts and researchers of an 
RDC are considerable too.  In effect, it is the RDC that takes 
responsibility for the IT systems, secure transfer of data 
from the data owner etc.  This leaves the analyst or 
researcher with the time to undertake analysis (although 
they still have a role in protecting the confidentiality of the 
data, but it is now less onerous).   
 
In addition, RDCs can make access to confidential data 
available to numerous analysts or researchers, so the 
research community itself, and therefore the public, will 
realise the benefits of access to data more evidently than if 
access is solely directly between a data owner and an analyst 
or researcher. 
 
4.2 The skills required 
 
RDCs have to work to gain the trust of data owners before 
access to confidential data can occur.  Putting this task in the 
context of mistakes which have occurred with confidential 
data, a wary public and adverse publicity (for example, 
laptops left on trains etc.), it is imperative that RDC staff can 
demonstrate beyond doubt, their robust approach to 
managing access to confidential data. 
 
A number of RDCs now have some kind of information 
governance accreditation (for example, the UK Data Service 
Secure Lab and the Health Foundation both have gained and 
maintained the ISO 27001 standard). 
 
In addition, it is important that data governance can be 
communicated clearly and succinctly:  to data owners who 
may be pressed for time and are trying to make the best 
decision; to the analysts and researchers who will access 
their data (so they know the role they have to play); and to 
the public whose data are collected, accessed and analysed 
within the RDC setting. 
 
Other skills required by RDC staff include: 
• the ability to maintain positive relationships with analysts 
and researchers who use their services (to enable 
monitoring and foresee and deal with emerging issues 
before they become problems, see for example, Desai and 
Ritchie (2009) 
• training analysts and researchers before they access the 
data (and run through their legal access to data, how to use 
the service safely and effectively, and how to avoid 
producing statistics that could reveal the identity of data 
subjects and/or reveal confidential information).   
• understanding of data (including legal requirements for 
protecting confidentiality, and the characteristics of data 
that make them ‘confidential’) 
• statistical know-how in order to assess statistical outputs 
for the risk that they could inadvertently reveal the 
identity of a data subject, and/or confidential information 
about them 
• a background in research and analysis, which enables staff 
to empathise with analysts and researchers, and ensure 
that optimal solutions for facilitating analysis and 
research with data can be achieved 
 
These skills enable RDCs to provide an effective service, 
both for analysts and researchers, and the data owners who 
agree to supply data to the RDCs.  Without qualified staff, 
the ability of an RDC to act as an intermediary and broker 
for data access will be limited. 
 
This is aside to the data negotiation skills which typically 
are left to senior RDC staff: satisfying data owners and 
analysts and researchers that the RDC as the intermediate 
solution for data access is the most efficient.   
 
Of course, much of this negotiation will involve the RDC 
demonstrating its potential to provide safe access to 
confidential data:  this requires more than just the senior 
RDC staff and their negotiating skills; demonstration relies 
on all RDC staff demonstrating their competence. 
 
4.3 Other advantages 
 
Aside from distributing the risk of data access, RDCs 
perform other useful functions that directly relieve data 
owners of the burden of providing access to confidential 
data.  These include: 
• screening of applications to access to data, to ensure that 
potential analysts and researchers provide sufficient, 
succinct information justifying their access request 
• managing the release of statistical outputs produced from 
data in an efficient manner 
• production of metadata (information about the data 
sources, that can assist analysis and research with data, 
and provide information for applicants of the data) 
• with sufficient knowledge transfer government 
departments can shift the bulk of on-going research data 
support to RDCs 
• bringing together analysts and researchers, and data 
owners, together to discuss findings from the results 
derived from the data 
 
These are all useful activities that many data owners would 
think of as time consuming, and have no provision for, but 
which are generally undertaken by RDCs. 
 
5 Data broking approaches 
 
As previously mentioned, often a productive outcome is 
achieved when a data owner and analyst or researcher first 
meet and share a common goal that requires using 
confidential data. Access can be provided, and it’s a good 
first test to see if the data can be used for the purpose in 
mind. 
 
However, this paper argues that such an approach will result 
in limited outcomes:  access to data by one analyst or 
researcher, and with the data owner liable for most of the 
risk of providing access.  Of course, it should be kept in 
mind that it is the analyst or researcher who is most likely to 
instigate the idea of using data, and can explain statistical 
concepts and what can be achieved with the data, and the 
relevance of the results to the data owner. 
 
For these reasons, a sensible approach would be for 
discussions to begin between a data owner and analyst or 
researcher; with an RDC becoming involved when 
discussions about practicalities of accessing data, training, 
releasing statistical outputs etc., immediately and in the 
long-term, become necessary.   
 
Or for example, the analyst or researcher could approach a 
data owner accompanied by RDC staff.  This two-pronged 
approach brings together the expertise of the analyst or 
researcher, with the expertise for managing the data 
efficiently. 
 
In any case, this paper argues that efficient access to 
confidential data is achieved when data owners, analysts or 
researchers, and RDCs work together in partnership.  
 
6 Summary 
 
This paper has considered the role of Research Data Centres 
(RDCs) with respect to providing a broker service between 
data owners (who may be risk-averse about providing access 
to confidential data), and analysts or researchers (who wish 
to access such data). 
 
RDCs can play a number of roles in facilitating access to 
confidential data, providing that RDC staff have sufficient 
skills to demonstrate that they are a robust service for 
acquiring, managing and providing access to such data. 
 
The main role that an RDC can play is to efficiently 
distribute the risk of providing access to confidential data; 
ensuring that data owners do not take all the risk.  With 
appropriate safeguards and assurances in place, RDCs can 
better facilitate access to confidential data, as they have the 
expertise, knowledge of data, experience of managing 
analysts and researchers effectively, and understand how to 
assess statistical outputs that are derived from the data, and 
released.   
 
Not only does this provide reassurance to a data owner, but 
it reduces the workload for them considerably.  Potentially, 
this enables more confidential data to be made available. 
 
For analysts and researchers, the use of RDCs are clear too:  
they can receive more support when accessing the data, and 
the burden of supplying their own secure data infrastructure 
is lifted from them, leaving their time to be spent analysing 
the data. 
 
For these reasons, RDCs can be thought of as playing a vital 
role in ensuring efficient access to confidential data occurs 
via their data brokering role. 
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